Why Shein and Temu Survived the End of the De Minimis Loophole

What happens to a business built on $12 dresses when the government closes the door that let its packages in duty-free? For Shein and Temu, the forecast looked grim. Washington ended the de minimis exemption for Chinese and Hong Kong parcels in May 2025, then extended the end to shipments from every country in late August. The common assumption was that the ultra-cheap cross-border model would buckle.
It did not. Prices crept up, advertising budgets were reshuffled and some listings disappeared, but both platforms kept delivering to American doorsteps. Their survival owes less to luck than to the structure underneath. The exemption was a subsidy that helped, not the foundation holding the house up.

What the Loophole Actually Did
Section 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930 let shipments valued under $800 enter the United States without duties and with lighter customs paperwork. It was written for an era of souvenirs and mail-order gifts, and it became the plumbing of an entire industry. A parcel from a factory in Guangdong to a living room in Ohio could skip the formal entry process that a container of sneakers had to clear. The savings included duty, but also time, inspection friction and compliance cost.
The popular story holds that this was the whole margin. It was not. The loophole removed a cost, but Shein’s edge came from somewhere else: small production runs, close monitoring of what sells and reordering only what moves. A supplier makes a modest batch of a new design, and the platform’s sales data decides whether it gets scaled up. That keeps unsold inventory low, and in fashion, markdowns and dead stock eat more profit than most tariff lines ever will.
Temu works from a different angle but arrives at similar economics. It connects shoppers to a vast pool of manufacturers and pushes them to compete on price in a way a department store buyer never could. Factories that once sold to wholesalers on thin margins now sell directly to consumers, in a format where the platform sets the pace. Ending the exemption adds a tax to that arrangement. It does not dissolve the arrangement.
The Messy First Weeks
The initial reaction was untidy. Temu sharply cut its US advertising spending as the new rules took effect, and shoppers saw items go out of stock or reappear at higher prices. Shein nudged prices up on many products and added fees tied to the new import costs. For a brand whose identity is the impulse buy, any friction at checkout looked dangerous.
But friction is not the same as flight. A price increase on a $9 item changes an order total by a couple of dollars, and a shopper comparing alternatives found that most of them were getting more expensive too.

Why the Model Bent Instead of Breaking
The most important adaptation is physical. Instead of mailing one parcel at a time from China, the platforms have pushed sellers to ship goods in bulk to warehouses inside the United States, so that individual orders travel domestically. Bulk ocean freight costs far less per unit than single air parcels, and duties are typically assessed on a declared value closer to what goods cost wholesale than to what a shopper pays at checkout. Temu’s expansion of local fulfillment, along with its semi-managed arrangement in which the platform takes on more of the logistics, fits this logic. The tariff still bites, but on a smaller base. Delivery times shrink as a bonus, which removes one of the oldest complaints about both apps.
Second, competitors did not get an escape hatch. American retailers selling goods made in China already paid duties on formal imports, and now face higher tariff rates themselves. When every rival’s costs rise, the gap between a Shein top and a mall-brand equivalent narrows in dollars but holds in proportion. Shein has also been building supplier relationships outside China, a slow shift that tariff pressure makes more urgent but did not invent. The company never needed the loophole to be cheaper than its rivals. It needed to stay cheaper after the loophole was gone, and a cost advantage built on inventory discipline travels well.
Third, habit does a lot of quiet work. Both apps are built as entertainment: countdown timers, flash deals, reward points and a constant stream of new arrivals. People who open an app to browse do not run a price comparison before every purchase, so a moderate fee rarely breaks the routine. The customer base also skews toward budget-conscious households, and for those households the alternatives to a $9 top are not obviously cheaper.

The irony is that survival came by making these companies look more like the retailers they disrupted. US warehouses, inventory held on shore, customs brokers and compliance staff all add fixed costs and the risk of unsold stock, the very burden the on-demand model was designed to avoid. Shein and Temu cleared the tariff hurdle, but a warehouse-heavy version of their business has to hold prices low enough to keep the shoppers who came for the $5 shirt. How



